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Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide unconditional secure communication between
two distant parties1. Although the significance of QKD is undisputed, its feasibility has been
questioned because of certain limitations in the practical application of real-life QKD sys-
tems. It is a common belief the lack of perfect single-photon source and the existence of de-
tection loss will handicap the feasibility of QKD by creating security loopholes and distance
limitations2, 3. The measurement device independent QKD (MDIQKD)4, 5 with decoy-state
method6–8 removes the security threats from both the imperfect single-photon source and the
detection loss. Lengthening the distance and improving the key rate of QKD with such a su-
perior method is thus the central issue in the practical application of QKD. Here, we report
the results of MDIQKD over 404 km of ultralow-loss optical fibre and 311 km of standard
optical fibre by employing an optimized four-intensity decoy-state method9. This record-
breaking implementation of MDIQKD method not only provides a new distance record for
both MDIQKD and all types of QKD systems10, 11, more significantly, it achieves a distance
that the traditional BB84 QKD would not be able to achieve with the same detection devices
even with ideal single-phone sources. For the first time, our work demonstrates that with
the MDIQKD method, imperfect devices can achieve better results than what ideal sources
could have achieved. This work represents a significant step towards proving and developing
a feasible long-distance QKD.
MDIQKD is naturally immune to all attacks against the detection system, which are believed
to be the main threat to QKD. Tremendous experimental efforts have been made in labs12–21, field
tests12, 22, and over networks23. So far, the longest transmission record for MDIQKD is 200 km15
in which the key rate, 0.018 bits per second (bps), seems not to meet the requirement for practical
applications. On the other hand, one of the advantages for QKD24 is to generate fresh secure keys
for instant use. This demands an appreciable final key generation in a time scale of seconds. How-
ever, prior MDIQKD experiments show that, if statistical fluctuations are taken into consideration,
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one would need an ample data size to reach a considerable final key rate12–23. In particular, the
number of total pulses at each side Nt is assumed to be 1012 or even larger25, which, for a 75 MHz
system15, would take more than 4 hours to accumulate enough data.
Several parameter optimization methods have been proposed to solve this problem26–28.
However, to fundamentally improve the key rate and distance at an enormous scale, making only
parameter optimizations is not sufficient. For long distance MDIQKD, large effects from statistical
fluctuations in estimating the phase error rate severely undermine the efficiency. It is important to
consider statistical fluctuations for different sources jointly and the worst-case estimation jointly
for both yield s11 and bit error rate e11 of single-photon pairs9, leading directly to the final key rate.
Here, we implement a new type of asymmetric four-intensity decoy state MDIQKD protocol9.
Each party exploits 3 different intensities 0, µx and µy in X basis, and only one intensity µz in
Z basis. The yield of single-photon pairs s11 can be calculated by the observed gains of each
two-pulse source in the X basis, specifically sources oo, ox, xo, oy, yo, xx, yy, while source zz
sending out signals in the Z basis is used to distill the final key. Given the total number of pulses,
the channel loss, and the system parameters, and bounded by joint constraints of the statistical
fluctuations9, 28, we can choose the values of µx, µy, µz and their corresponding probability dis-
tributions px, py, pz carefully via global optimization for all parameters to maximize the final key
rate9.
Figure 1 schematically shows our experimental setup for MDIQKD, which consists of two
identical legitimate users, Alice and Bob, and a distrustful relay, Charlie. Alice and Bob exploit in-
ternally modulated lasers to generate phase randomized weak coherent state (WCS) optical pulses.
The pulse laser is temperature-tunable, which can be used to adjust the wavelength to implement
two independent laser interference. To ensure the high visibility of two-photon interferences, an
extra intensity modulator (IM) is utilized to cut off the overshoot rising edge of the optical pulse.
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The full width at half maximum (FWHM) of the optimized optical pulse is 2.5 ns at a clock fre-
quency of 75 MHz, in the wavelength of 1550.12nm. At each side, two IMs, a phase modulator
(PM), and an asymmetrical Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI) are combined to form a time-bin
phase qubit encoder15. Meanwhile, two additional IMs are utilized to add decoy states according
to our optimization method9. The intensity arrangements and probability distribution are opti-
mized according to different transmission fibre distances. All these modulators are controlled by
random numbers independently and the corresponding radio-frequency signals come from a self-
made digital to analog converter based on a field programmable gate array. An electrical variable
optical attenuator (Att) reduces the pulse intensity down to single-photon level. Just before sending
the optical pulses through the quantum channel fibre is a dense wavelength division multiplexer
(DWDM) to filter spontaneous emission noise from the laser.
Next, Alice and Bob send their pulses through optical fibres to Charlie’s measurement site,
respectively. An beam splitter (BS) and two superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
(SNSPDs) constitute a Bell state measurement (BSM) device. The SNSPDs operate at 2.05 K and
provide detection efficiencies of 66% and 64% at the dark count rate of 30 counts per second. We
post-select the singlet Bell state |Ψ−〉 when the two detectors coincide at two alternative time bins.
The efficiency of time window is about 85%, which is an optimal trade-off between raw key rate
and error rate.
To achieve a stable and enduring MDIQKD system is not a trivial task. On the one hand, our
system should acquire rigorous timing and clock unification under the long transmission distance;
on the other hand, we must also solve technical complications to establish indistinguishability and
calibration for the phase reference frames of Alice and Bob (see Methods). In our setup, therefore,
we make use of automatic feedback systems to calibrate the time for laser modulation, and optimize
the spectrum and polarization of the two independent laser pulses from Alice and Bob.
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One of the most outstanding properties of the 4-intensity method9 is the key rate optimiza-
tion. Here we experimentally demonstrate this feature with 102 km standard optical fibre spool.
Given an error probability of 10−10, the key rate ranges from 321 to 7.9 bps with different input
values of µz and pz. Details of key rate analysis is shown in the Supplementary. This shows that
given the same device, the key rate can vary greatly from different parameters, see Fig. 2 a. Note
that the accumulation time and data size for each point are 10 minutes and 4.5×1010, respectively,
which are much more efficient compared to 130 hours and 3.51 × 1013 data size of the previous
experiment15, while the key rate in this work is two orders of magnitude higher than the previous
one at 100 km15. Meanwhile, as is shown in Fig. 2 b, without considering finite size effect, the
key rate can approach 3 kbps with the same fibre length and data accumulation time. This reaches
the level of the state-of-the-art key rate for short distance21.
In order to achieve longer distance, we increase the accumulation time. For example, in the
case of 311 km standard fibre, we run the system for 336.6 hours and a total number of 9.09×1013
pulse pairs are sent from each side in the experiment. Tens of thousands of data are collected.
Setting the failure probability to 10−10, we obtained 3135 bits for our final key.
For comparison, we implement MDIQKD at different distances of 102 km, 155 km, 207 km,
259 km, and 311 km. The optimized experimental parameters are listed in Table 1. Specifically, at
the distance of 207 km, we obtain a key rate of 9.55 bps, which is more than 500 times higher than
the earlier experiment15 for the same accumulation time. Among the huge rise, about 50 times are
due to the four-intensity method9, 28 and device improvements and the increase of the efficiency of
the time window can further raise the key rate by about 10 times. The achieved key rates at various
distances are shown in Fig. 3. The data size for each data point is listed in Table 1. It is interesting
that given the same device, at the the distance of 311 km, no secure key can be generated with the
traditional passive BB84 protocol, even if we do not consider statistical fluctuations and assume
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that the ideal single-photon (SP) source is implemented.
Consider the passive BB84 protocol with an ideal SP source. Let pX (pZ) be the probability
of BS to reflect (transmit) the incident light to the measurement port of X (Z) basis. Let d, η and
Sω be the dark count rate of detector, the overall efficiency and the gain of ω basis (ω = Z,X),
respectively. Exploiting the linear loss model, the gain and bit error rate of ω bases is Sω =
ηpω + 2d(1 − d)(1 − ηpω) and ew = d(1 − d)(1 − ηpw)/Sw, respectively, where we assume no
alignment errors and insertion loss. In our experimental setup, the loss of 311 km standard optical
fibre is 59.05 dB while the efficiency and dark count rate of detector are 65% and d = 7.2× 10−8,
respectively. Given the fact that 0 < pX < 1 and pX + pZ = 1, we find eX > 7.55% and
eX + eZ > 26.25%. Therefore, the asymptotic key rate can be given by 1−H(eX)−H(eZ) < 0,
where H(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is Shannon entropy. To make it clearer, we add
the theoretical curves of asymptotic key rates for balanced basis passive BB84 protocol using ideal
SP, the practical SP29 with g(2)(0) = 0.01 without decoy-state method and WCS with decoy-state
method in Fig. 3.
To push the transmission limit, we test the key generation with 404 km ultralow-loss fi-
bre (0.16 dB/km at 1550 nm) provided by Corning Incorporated. Based on the channel loss and
accumulation time, we set the optimized experimental parameters as µz = 0.413, µy = 0.302,
µx = 0.073, pz = 0.315, py = 0.110, and px = 0.529. With an accumulation time of three months,
we achieved 2584 bits final key with a key rate of 3.2× 10−4 bps and the result is shown in Figure
3 as well. This is by far the longest distance reported for all kinds of QKD systems.
Besides the long transmission distance, our system generates 1.38 kbits per second secure
finite key at 102 km, which constitutes a strong candidate for metropolitan quantum network with
untrustful relay23. We can further increase the system performance by increasing the system clock
rate21 and the efficiency of single photon detector30.
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Methods
To synchronize the entire MDIQKD system and precisely overlap the two pulses from Alice and
Bob at Charlie’s site so as to achieve perfect interference, we improve the time calibration system
and data collection system15. A crystal oscillator circuit exploited by Charlie generates 500 KHz
electric signals, which is used for the synchronization signals of the entire systems. Charlie sends
two independent synchronization laser pulses (SLP) at 1570 nm modulated by the 500 KHz elec-
tric signals to Alice and Bob through the extra classical channel fibre, respectively. Photoelectric
detectors and phase-locked loop used by Alice (Bob) detect the SLP and regenerate a system clock
frequency of 75 MHz by frequency multiplication, respectively. Charlie controls synchronization
lasers to make Alice and Bob alternatively send specific signal optical pulses to him through quan-
tum channel. Charlie records the arrival times of Alice’s and Bob’s signal optical pulses with his
SNSPD and calculates the difference. A programmable delay chip with 10 ps timing resolution
and synchronization signal delay method are exploited to compensate the difference of time. The
chromatic dispersions of 404 km of ultralow-loss optical fibre and 311 km of standard optical fibre
are both less than 30 ps, which is much smaller than the signal pulse width of 2.5 ns. For circum-
venting the time drift of long distance fibre, we calibrate the time synchronization of systems every
30 minutes.
To guarantee the indistinguishability of spectrum, we elaborately select two semiconductor
laser diodes with nearly identical system parameters, such as central wavelength, spectrum shape
and pulse shape. Exploiting the Fabry-Perot interferometer with a resolution of 0.06 pm, the
FWHM of laser pulse spectrum is 3.2 pm. By using optical spectrum analyzer and the temperature
controller inside the lasers, the central wavelength of laser can be feedback controlled. The central
wavelength difference of two lasers is less than 0.3 pm for each spectrum calibration. The laser
central wavelength will almost not change within an hour if it steadily emits optical pulses.
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A fast axis blocked polarization maintaining BS is utilized to maintain polarization consis-
tency and good interference. Before the two ways of signal optical pulses enter the BS to interfere,
we add an electric polarization controller and a polarization beam splitter to adjust the polarization,
respectively. Exploiting the extra SNSPD with 30 dark counts per second, we can maintain high
visibility real time feedback even in the experiment with 404 km of ultralow-loss optical fibre,
because the effective count per second of SNSPD is still about 3900.
A phase stabilization system is improved to share the stabilized phase reference frame be-
tween Alice and Bob13. A phase feedback laser generates pulses with the width of 1 ns and the
central wavelength of 1550.12 nm to go through the AMZIs of Alice and Bob. A stabilized and
good interference of the feedback optical pulse represents the low misalignment of phase reference
frames, which is feedback controlled by a phase shifter and avalanche photodiode single-photon
detector. To decrease the error of X basis, the central wavelength of the phase feedback laser is
also adjusted by the optical spectrum analyzer and temperature controller every 4 fours and the
AMZIs of Alice and Bob are carefully developed with a high visibility of 200:1.
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Figure 1: Experimental setup for the MDIQKD system. Alice’s (Bob’s) phase randomized weak
coherent state pulses are modulated into four decoy-state intensities by two IMs. An AMZI, two
IMs and one PM are to encode time-bin phase qubits. TC, temperature controller, AC, alternating
current, DC, direct current, Circ., circulator, PS, phase shifter, IM, intensity modulator, PM, phase
modulator, AMZI, asymmetrical Mach-Zehnder interferometer, Att., attenuator, DWDM, dense
wavelength division multiplexer, BS, beam splitter, SNSPD, superconducting nanowire single-
photon detector.
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Figure 2: MDIQKD key rates versus intensity µz and probability pz. a, The key rates of 102
km standard fibre with a 10-minute data accumulation time. By varying the signal state intensities
µz and probabilities pz, we achieve key rates from 7.9 to 321 bps with a failure probability of
10−10. b, The key rates of the same experimental data without finite size effect. The key rates are
more than 1.5 kbps for all signal state intensities µz and probabilities pz.
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Figure 3: Experimental results. The experimental results (the symbols) agree well with the theo-
retical simulations (solid lines), with a maximum transmission distance of 404 km of ultralow-loss
optical fibre and 311 km of standard optical fibre. We also include simulations for balanced basis
passive BB84 protocol using ideal SP sources, the practical SP with g(2)(0) = 0.01 without decoy-
state method, the WCS with decoy-state method and the results of ref. 15 shown as the dotted lines
for comparison. Note that although the MDIQKD produces lower key rates than BB84 protocol, it
can offer further secure transmission distance.
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Table 1: Optimized intensities (µα) and probabilities (pα) for each distance in our
experimental setup.
Distance 102km 155km 207km 259km 311km 404km
µz 0.891 0.864 0.757 0.677 0.453 0.413
µy 0.189 0.191 0.203 0.267 0.363 0.302
µx 0.049 0.058 0.059 0.064 0.083 0.073
pz 0.827 0.789 0.731 0.509 0.409 0.315
py 0.025 0.038 0.042 0.068 0.101 0.110
px 0.128 0.154 0.201 0.388 0.439 0.529
Nt 2.05× 10
12 2.03× 1012 3.61× 1013 3.55× 1013 9.09× 1013 6.04× 1014
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